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CONSTRUCTING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE STORY 
OF IAWMAKING IN CHILKAT INDIAN 
VILlAGE, IRA V. JOHNSON 
VANESSA MAGNANINI* 
Attorney Tony Strong had only minutes to figure out a way to stop 
MichaelJohnson's hired van from entering his native village of Kluk-
wan, Alaska and removing the most revered artifacts the village owned. l 
"Have Uncle Albert go cut some trees down [and] fell them across the 
road,» he told his sister Lonnie on the phone.2 His sister, who had 
called Tony in Washington, D.C. to get his lawyerly advice, ran to her 
Uncle Albert's house and said, "Tony said you should fell some trees 
across the road. "5 Uncle Albert grabbed his chain saw, felled the trees, 
and laid them across the road so that the van arriving to appropriate 
the totems could not enter the village.4 For almost two months after 
the attempted incident, villagers would not allow anybody to enter the 
village unless accompanied by someone who was trusted not to remove 
the artifacts.5 
The phone call was attorney Tony Strong's first alert to art dealer 
Michael Johnson'S attempts to remove the Chilkat Indian Village's 
Whale House artifacts.6 It was 1976 and his sister, admittedly distressed, 
said, "they [Stella Johnson and another man] are coming into town to 
steal the Whale House artifacts. . . . They're on their way in the van 
now. And everybody's upset They don't want it to go. And they don't 
know what to do. "7 Tony shuffled a series of thoughts through his head: 
(1) there was no time to go to ajudge and ask for an injunctions and 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
1 Su Interview by Nell Newton with Tony Strong, Chilkat village member and attorney in 
Juneau, Alaska, in Washington D.C., 1 (Apr. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Strong]. 
2Id. 
SId. 
4 Su id.; see also Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v.Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6un (1993) [herein-
after Chilkat IIlJ. 
5 Su Strong, supra note I, at 1; see also Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 6131. 
6 See Strong, supra note I, at 1. 
7Id. 
8Su itl. 
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(2) calling law enforcement would have created a jurisdictional ques-
tion over who had authority within the Klukwan village-the State 
Troopers or the City of Haines police.9 The most effective solution 
would be to have his Uncle Albert block the village entrance.lO Mter 
all, Tony reasoned, if the village of Klukwan was sovereign, it should 
have an absolute right to determine membership because of its inher-
ent tribal sovereignty.ll 
For many villagers, blocking the village entrance was the preface 
to a seventeen-year saga and nine-year court battle. Chilkat Indian 
Village, IRA v. Johnson (Chilkat Ill) would not only settle questions of 
ownership but would do so by acknowledging that identity plays a key 
role in the determination of tribal ownership issues and sovereignty.12 
Chilkat Ills most evident success was the establishment that Alaskan 
tribes have civil jurisdiction over their land and can enforce their civil 
laws against non-natives who are not tribal members. IS 
The legal story of Chilkat III demonstrates that tribal identity is 
determined through the semiotic process of storytelling and through 
exchanges of dialogue.14 Semiotic theory analyzes the exchange of 
signs (words or legal arguments) in communication that establishes 
meaning.15 The Chilkat people's definition of identity is reinforced 
9 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R at 6127; Strong, supra note 1, at 1. Note the interchangeable use 
of the words Chilkat and Klukwan. When the village of Klukwan created its Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA) government in the 1930s, it was given the title of "Chilkat Indian Village." In this Note, 
the word "Chilkat" will be used when referring to the case name and to the IRA village name. 
See Chilkat III, 20 l.L.R at 6172; Strong, supra note 1, at 1. The Village of Klukwan, as most 
villagers refer to it, is in the Chilkat River Valley. See Strong, supra note 1, at 2. "Chilkat" means 
"river that provides life," and appropriately, the Chilkat River is the carrier of every anadromous 
species of salmon that exists in the Northwest. See id. Chilkat Indian Village is the last remaining 
village of the Chilkat Indians, once the most powerful of 17 Tlingit tribes. See Marilee Enge, Battle 
Over a Birthright, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Enge, Battle Over a 
Birthrightl. A large population of Tlingit Indians inhabited the southeast tip of the Alaskan 
panhandle and some Tlingits lived as far north as the Yakutat on the Gulf of Alaska. See id. 
10 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R at 6131; Strong, supra note 1, at 1. 
11 See Chilkat III, 20 l.L.R at 6131; Strong, supra note 1, at 1. The tree felling incident was 
in its own right an exercise of tribal sovereignty. By locking the appropriators out of the village, 
villagers exerted their inherent right to keep non-members out. Testimony indicated that this was 
MichaelJohnson's second unsuccessful attempt in 1976 to remove the totems. See Chilkat III, 20 
I.L.R at 6131. The first attempt was thwarted when villagers placed skiffs in front of the door to 
the Whale House to block entry. See id. 
12 See Chilkat 111,20 l.L.R at 6127-42. 
I~ See id. 
14 See id. at 6130-37. See generally Richard Delgado, Storytelling fqr oppositionists and Others: 
A Plea fqr Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2413 (1988). Delgado believes that storytelling 
reinforces community building: "stories build consensus, a common culture of shared under-
standings, and deeper, more vital ethics." Id. at 2414. 
15 See ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAw AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 5, 33 (1988); Dragan Milovanovic, 
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both through oral testimony given in court and through text, as in the 
actual case opinion.16 
In Chilkat IlL two legal communities with different conceptions of 
justice, tribal customary law, and dominant federal law, melded to 
construct tribal sovereignty.17 The fundamental tension in Chilkat III 
was that there were different community understandings of the value 
and boundaries set for communication. IS The meanings of "ownership" 
and "property" collided in the clash of Western inheritance laws and 
tribal customary law.19 In an effort to have its own interpretive system 
acknowledged, the Chilkat village was prompted to adopt the domi-
nant culture's system of law by creating a court in which to settle its 
claims.20 What resulted from the fusion of both legal processes was the 
construction of tribal sovereignty and the emergence of a revolution-
ary definition of justice.21 The Chilkat village's definition of justice 
encompassed community identity within the legal setting.22 
Oftentimes, law replaces weapons by substituting language to cre-
ate dominance.23 Yet, the sovereignty created in the Chilkat III tribal 
court presents a bird's-eye view of how a subordinated culture re-
defined the legal cultural construction given to it by the dominant 
culture.24 In Chilkat IlL identity of the community resided through the 
artifacts, creating communal interests within the artifacts.25 Western 
property notions of possession and control were balanced with the 
discourse ofidentity.26 Storytelling testimony in court propounded that 
identity was not something owned, but shared.27 In order to determine 
whether the artifacts were property within the meaning of the tribal 
Artifacts Ordinance, one needed to discover how identity lay within 
The Postmodemist Turn: Lacan, Psychoanalytic Semiotics, and the Construction of Subjectivity in Law, 
8 EMORY OO'L L. REv. 67, 78 (1994). 
16 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127-42; Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal 
Reality, 18 VT. L. REv. 681, 686-87 (1994). See generally Delgado, supra note 14. 
17 See generally Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 6127-42. 
18 See ill. 
19 See ill. at 6130-37. 
20 See Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384, 386 (D. Alaska 1978); Chilkat III, 
20 I.L.R. at 6127-29; Strong, supra note I, at 1. 
21 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130-37. 
22 See ill. 
25 See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585, 589 (1994). Subject-Object opposition theory can 
be compared with semiotic theory due to the similar inquiry into sign systems and cultural 
construction of identity. See id. at 585-97. 
24 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130-37; Carriere, supra note 23, at 585-97. 
25 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130-37. 
26 See ill. 
27 See ill. 
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the artifacts.2s This could only be done by semiosis, or dialogue.29 Since 
law is a semiotic function, the legal arena was able to facilitate the 
dialogue.3o 
Law is fundamentally a semiotic process because it is always chang-
ing. Moreover, the reinterpretation of existing law creates new law.!!1 
Similarly, definitions of identity are continually reinterpreted in ac-
cordance with the changing signs of communities.32 Language is the 
carrier of meaning, and since both creation of law and identity are 
semiotic processes, language serves as a tool and linchpin to facilitate 
the evolution of both constructs.33 
A grievance commonly shared by many Indian communities is the 
existence of an unstructured legal identity within the American legal 
system.34 This article tells the story of Chilkat III through a semiotic 
process.35 Chilkat III is an exemplary starting point from which to 
analyze how two court systems may operate within different sign mean-
ings, yet transform the signs in order to achieve a similar interpretive 
understanding.!l6 In short, this process explores the cultural and legal 
construction of a tribal court and therefore, of sovereignty.37 Com-
prised within this legal account are numerous stories which create the 
Chilkat village's present legal reality.3s Part I will discuss the artifacts, 
the players, the procedural history, and some of the legal rhetoric used 
by both sides to advance their cases. Part II will address semiotic theory 
as applied to the Chilkat III case, and Part III will focus on the narrative 
and dialogue used by the plaintiffs during the litigation phase to 
establish community values concerning tribal property. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
31 See Robin Paul Malloy, A Sign of the Times-Law and Semiotics, 65 TuL. L. REv. 211, 214 
(1990) (reviewing ROBERTA KEVELSON, 'THE LAw AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS (1988)}. Law, when viewed 
as a semiotic process, "is not predetermined; it is contingent and is not a self<ontained system 
of inquiry." Id. at 215. 
52 See Delgado, supra note 14, at 2411-18; Malloy, supra note 31, at 215. 
35 See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 5-6,33; Malloy, supra note 31, at 214. 
34 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127-42. 
35 See id. 
56 See id. at 6130-37.Judge Bowen allowed narrative accounts to enter the courtroom in order 
to rectify the Klukwan sign system. See id. 
57 See Carriere, supra note 23, at 594--96. 
58 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127-42. 
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I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR CONSTRUCTION 
A. The Artifacts 
One April night in 1984, Bill Thomas, his Uncle Clarence, and 
two members of the Chilkat village removed the Whale House artifacts 
from the Whale House and drove to the City of Haines.39 Their strategy 
was to remove the totemic poles and rain screen while the majority of 
the villagers were out playing Bingo.40 The nine-foot tall spruce totems 
were wrapped in carpet padding and the eleven-by-sixteen foot rain 
screen was dismantled.41 The artifacts were transported to a motel in 
Haines where art collector Michael Johnson was eagerly awaiting the 
treasures.42 A week later,Johnson delivered a van carrying the artifacts 
to Seattle by an Alaska state ferry. 43 
The thieves took extraordinary steps to protect the artifacts be-
cause of their inherent spiritual meaning and age.44 The rain screen is 
a carved mural of the Rain Spirit with a passageway that the Whale 
House Chief once used to reach his private quarters.45 The four totems 
are of great significance to the villagers because the totems depict the 
four main groups that comprise the Whale House.46 Each post, colored 
in faded vermilion and blue, depicts a mythic story about how the 
Ganaxteidi came north to the Chilkat River Valley generations ago.47 
The totems were made as roof pillars for the Whale House, a 
historic ceremonial house within the Raven Clan.48 They were made of 
spruce to allow for greater detail.49 Marilee Enge, a journalist who 
covered the Chilkat III trial, writes that each post is an "intricate mosaic 
~9 See itt. at 6136; Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. 
40 See Marilee Enge, Clan's Artifacts Returned, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 4, 1994, at Al 
[hereinafter Enge, Clan's Artifactsl. 
41 See itt. 
42 See itt. 
4~ See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6136; Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. 
44 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R at 6131; Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. 
45 See Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. "Anna Katzeek testified that she 
understood the artifact known as the rain screen to depict the 'rains-falling of the rains in the 
great flood which covered the earth, which the Tlingit people witnessed.'" Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. 
at 6135 n.24. 
46 See Marilee Enge, Master Carver, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 1993, at Al [hereinafter 
Enge, Master Carverl. 
47 See itt. 
4S See Deloris Tarzan Ament, Whose Treasures? Legal Battle Between Family and Village Over 
Prized Images FinaUy Nears Its Conclusion, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 1, 1993, at CI. 
49 See Enge, Master Carver, supra note 46, at AI. 
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of animal, human and otherworldly creatures that flow from one into 
the other. Every space has a form or a figure that gives the totems their 
beauty and enriches their tales. "50 The Sea Creature Post tells the story 
of the sea monster Guankadeit. 51 Guankadeit holds a whale in its 
mouth and within the whale's tail appears the sad face of a woman.52 
Apart from oral tradition, these totems remain the history books of the 
Chilkat culture which has no written language. 53 
The leader of the Ganaxteidi clan commissioned the totems from 
Kadjisdu.axtc, a man considered to have been the best carver of the 
Northwest.54 As a result, the totems are the most desirable carvings in 
the Northwest Coast.55 
A series of black and white photos published in the mid-1980s by 
two Juneau photographers made the totems known to the art world. 56 
Due to their fame, Michael Johnson would be able to sell the artifacts 
to the highest bidder, a task that would not be difficult since art 
collectors, art galleries, and universities57 nationwide had already ex-
pressed an interest to buy them.58 
50Id. 
5l See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. 
54 See Enge, Clans Artifacts, supra note 40, at AI; Enge, Master Carver, supra note 46, at AI. 
55 See Enge, Clan's Artifacts, supra note 40, at AI. 
56 See Enge, Master Carver, supra note 46, at AI. 
57 See Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v.Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6137 (1993) [hereinafter ChilJr.at 
III]; see also Marilee Enge, Collecting the Past, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 6, 1993, at Al 
[hereinafter Enge, Collecting the Past]. Note the demand of the Whale House artifacts and the 
villagers' resistance to sale over the past century. See Enge, Collecting the Past, at AI. In the early 
1900s, the University of Pennsylvania hired Louis Shortridge to work as an agent for its archae-
ological department and to acquire as many Tlingit artifacts as possible. See id. Louis Shortridge 
was born in 1882 into a noble Tlingit family. See id. His father, George Shortridge was a Chilkat 
chief, the hitsati, or keeper of the Whale House. See id. Shortridge acquired 232 Northwest 
treasures and meticulously recorded the stories that accompanied each of them. See id. As a result, 
the University of Pennsylvania has the most extensive collection of Tlingit artifacts in the United 
States. See id. During an expedition in 1922, Shortridge met with the leading men of the 
Ganaxteidi tribe and urged them to sell the Whale House objects. See id. He offered $3,500 and, 
like Michael Johnson, attempted to convince the leaders that the artifacts "will stand as evidence 
of the Tlingit claim of a place in primitive culture." See id. Shortridge was turned down, and this 
rejection led to his lifelong quest to acquire the artifacts. See id. Shortridge continued to negotiate 
year after year, and each year his efforts caused greater animosity within the Chilkat region. See 
id. Shortridge lost his job in 1932 due to the Great Depression and returned to Alaska shortly 
thereafter. See id. He furthered his unpopularity by becoming a government stream guard whose 
responsibility was to prevent fishing in closed areas. See id. In 1937, he was found on the ground 
with a broken neck near his cabin in Sitka. See id. A local school teacher took him to a hospital 
where he died 10 days later. See id. Enge writes that the story among Natives is that Shortridge 
was killed, most probably by people who accused him of selling out his heritage. See id. 
58 See Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. 
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The thieves also attempted to remove a fourteen-foot feast dish 
carved in the shape of a woodworm, but its bottom was rotted out and 
they were unable to remove it without it crumbling.59 Enge's sensitive 
reporting links the plight of the woodworm with the villagers' strug-
gle.60 Enge wrote: 
The story of the woodworm tells how the Ganaxteidi clan, 
which includes the members of the Whale House, came north 
to the Chilkat region from Prince of Wales Island. The myth 
is also portrayed on one of the house posts. "A chief's daugh-
ter found the worm in a woodpile and kept it as a pet, secretly 
feeding it until it grew very large. She loved it and sang a little 
song that still is sung by Tlingit mothers. But when her family 
discovered the worm, they reacted with dread. Her uncle 
called a meeting, and people decided that the woodworm 
must be destroyed before it killed everybody in the village. 
While the girl was lured from home, the village men brought 
their sharp wooden spears against the worm, and killed it. 
The chief's daughter was devastated. The event so divided the 
village that her family, the Ganaxteidi clan, left and migrated 
north. " Today, the Ganaxteidi people are once again divided, 
this time by the carvings created nearly two centuries ago to 
depict their history and to bring them together.61 
Unlike Enge's belief that the carvings were the cause of commu-
nity dissociation, it was the concept of individual ownership, intro-
duced by art dealer Michael johnson, that caused division among 
community members.62 In 1976, Michael johnson attempted to con-
vince Estelle johnson, the niece of a previous Whale House Keeper, 
that she was the rightful owner by descent of the Whale House arti-
facts.63 Mr. johnson then financed an action in federal court to deter-
mine ownership rights.64 When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the tribal court had jurisdiction to decide ownership issues, 
Michael johnson approached the Chilkat III tribal defendants and 
AI. 
59 See id.; see also Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6136. 
60 See Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at AI. 
61Id. 
62 See generally Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6136; Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9, at 
6~ See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6136. Estelle Johnson is the niece of Victor Hotch, the Whale 
House leader from 1944-1981. See Marilee Enge, To Sell or Not, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 
7, 1993, at AI. 
64 See Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384 (D. Alaska 1978). 
52 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORW LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:45 
convinced them to sell him the artifacts.65 Mr. Johnson's persistence in 
acquiring the artifacts continued throughout the most recent action 
instituted in 1990.66 When defendant Bill Thomas wrote Mr. Johnson 
a letter informing him that the artifacts were no longer for sale, Mr. 
Johnson responded with a threatening letter that said he was not going 
to "'get shafted.'"67 
B. Applicable Law 
Mter the first attempt to remove the artifacts in 1976, the village 
was prompted to create an Artifacts Ordinance which prohibited the 
removal of clan property without first requesting and obtaining per-
mission from the tribe's governing body, the Chilkat Indian VIllage 
Council.68 The 1976 Artifacts Ordinance read: 
No person shall enter onto the property of the Chilkat Indian 
Village for the purpose of buying, trading for, soliciting the 
purchase of, or otherwise seeking to arrange a removal of ar-
tifacts, clan crests, or other traditional Indian art work owned 
or held by members of the Chilkat Indian Village or kept 
within the boundaries of the real property owned by the 
Chilkat Indian VIllage, without first requesting and obtaining 
permission to do so from the Chilkat Indian Village Council.69 
Aware that it would need a judicial body to uphold the ordinance, 
the Council also passed the Tribal Court Ordinance 80-001, authoriz-
ing the establishment of a tribal court.70 The Tribal Court Ordinance 
was enacted in 1980 after approval by the Bureau ofIndian Affairs and 
subsequent to an amendment of the tribe's constitution.71 It estab-
lished trial and appellate courts of record; the requirements to qualifY 
as a tribal court judge; appointment of judges pro tem ("as was required 
in [Chilkat 1/lj where the sitting judges might have had or be perceived 
to have a conflict"); and most importantly, it addressed the applicable 
law for cases brought into the Chilkat court's jurisdiction. 72 The law as 
65 See id.; Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R at 6136. 
66 See Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R at 6136. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 6129; Strong, supra note 1, at 8. 
69 Chilkat HI, 20 I.L.R at 6136. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 6130. 
72 See id. 
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applied would include applicable Tlingit custom law.73 Criminal juris-
diction was specifically disclaimed under Article III of the ordinance; 
however, civil jurisdiction was retained under Article VII, Section 
(1) (b), which provided that "pending the adoption of tribal proce-
dural rules 'the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, insofar 
as they are applicable and compatible with Tlingit custom and law, shall 
be followed in the Trial Court and Court of Appeals of the Chilkat 
Indian Village.'''74 
The Artifacts Ordinance served as a linchpin for all further court 
action since it established a written sovereignty, which both federal and 
state courts would be reluctant to override.75 The Ordinance however, 
would not deter Michael Johnson from scheming his way into owner-
ship.76 
C. Procedural Background 
To fully understand how the legal framework of Chilkat III resulted 
from the enactment of the Artifacts Ordinance, it is necessary to 
summarize the procedural history that led to Chilkat IIL77 Mter the 
1984 removal of the artifacts, the Chilkat Indian Village filed an action 
in federal district court against Michael Johnson and his corporation.78 
The Tribal Council requested monetary and injunctive relief based on 
the Council's allegations that Mr. Johnson had violated the 1976 Arti-
facts Ordinance.79 The district court enjoined Mr. Johnson in both his 
personal and corporate capacities from selling or disposing of the 
totems and rain screen.80 The court further enjoined fourteen more 
defendants (Tlingit defendants), all of whom were members of the 
Whale House.81 The court then dismissed a summary judgment motion 
brought by the Chilkat Indian Village under 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (which 
prohibits embezzlement and theft from Indian tribes), holding that 18 
U.S.C. § 1163 does not create a private cause of action in federal 
court.82 A separate memo issued by the court stated that the court 
7~ See id. at 6129-30. 
74 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6129-30. 
75 See id. at 6127-28; Strong, supra note 1, at 8. 
76 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130. 
77 See Strong, supra note 1, at 8. 
78 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127. 
79 See ill. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See Chilkat Indian Village v.Johnson, 643 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Alaska 1986) [hereinafter 
Chilkat 1]; Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127. 
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the remaining claims, that the 
artifacts were communally owned and that the defendants' removal of 
the artifacts created a conversion claim arising under state rather than 
federal law. 83 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal under 
18 U.S.C. § 1163 as well as the dismissal against the fourteen Tlingit 
defendants but reversed on the village's claim against MichaelJohnson 
and his corporation, holding that "the tribe's enforcement of its ordi-
nance against those non-Indian defendants raised federal questions."84 
More importantly, in remanding the case to the district court, the court 
of appeals delineated the issue which would be decided in Chilkat /II: 
the village's power to enforce its ordinance and apply it to non-Indi-
ans.85 The court further noted that within the locus of enforcing its 
ordinance lay questions concerning whether the village was a federally 
recognized tribe, "whether it possesse[d] general legislative powers, 
or jurisdiction over the artifacts and defendants in particular, and 
whether its fee lands constitute[d] Indian Country .... "86 
On remand,Johnson moved for summary judgment on the prem-
ise that even if the tribal court had the power to enforce its ordinance 
against him, he did not violate the ordinance.87 The district court 
rejected Johnson's argument on the basis that if the village possessed 
sufficient attributes of sovereignty, then tribal remedies would have to 
be exhausted before the district court had jurisdiction.88 The court 
then requested that both parties brief the court as to the issues of the 
village's retained sovereign authority.89 
The district court granted the village's motion for summary judg-
ment on issues of tribal sovereignty and exhaustion, holding that "acts 
of Congress and the executive lead this court to conclude that Chilkat 
Indian Village has been recognized as a tribe by the federal govern-
men t. ''90 The court noted that tribes possess civil regulatory and judicial 
83 See Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter 
Chilkat 11]; Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127. 
84 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6128 (citing Chilkat II, 870 F.2d at 1475). 
85 See Chilkat II, 870 F.2d at 1474. 
86 Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6128 (citing Chilkat II, 870 F.2d at 1474). 
87 See id. 
88 See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe ofIndians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); 
Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6128. 
89 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6128. 
90Id. 
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authority in civil matters over non-Indians and held that the power to 
pass the ordinance:91 
was part of the retained, inherent power of the Chilkat Indian 
Village. In addition, it would appear that under its constitu-
tional power, Chilkat Indian Village had the power to prevent 
the sale or disposition of any assets of the Village without the 
consent of the Council. The court further agrees that alleged 
acquisition by a non-Indian of the artifacts in question would 
constitute conduct that would have some direct effect on the 
welfare of the tribe .... 92 
The court also found the villag~wned fee lands at Klukwan to be 
Indian Country as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.95 The court's deter-
mination that the Chilkat Indian Village was Indian Country was a 
key point in bringing the defendants under the jurisdiction of tribal 
law.94 Technically, the land from which the artifacts were removed 
had to constitute a "dependent Indian community" under the 18 
U.S.C. statute.95 The defendants countered with the argument that 
the Alaska Native Land Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)96 extin-
guished any authority that a village could have over a defined 
territory.97 Since nothing in the ANCSA preamble indicated a "clear 
and plain" intention to abrogate or limit a treaty right, the court 
held that the status of Klukwan as a dependent Indian community 
was not extinguished by the ANCSA. 98 
91 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6128. 
92 Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 6128 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 545). 
9S See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See 18 U.S.CA § 1151 (West 1997); Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6128. Indian country was given 
its present definition by 18 U.S.CA § 1151, which delineated lands that would be considered 
Indian country. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMEmCAN INDIAN LAw IN A NUTSHELL 91 (1981).18 
U.S.CA § 1151 (a) included all Indian reservations and "dependent Indian communities." See id. 
at 91-92. The Chilkat village, although not a reservation, still qualifies as Indian country under 
18 U.S.CA § 1151 because of its dependent Indian community status. 
964!J U.S.CA § 1601-1629F (West 1997). 
97 See Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 6128. The Alaska Native Land Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) 
expressly extinguished all aboriginal titles to land in Alaska, but provided for the establishment, 
under state law, of village and regional corporations in which enrolled Natives would receive 
corporate stock. See CANBY, supra note 95, at 2!J6. Chilkat village is one such corporation. Native 
corporations then receive title to their land in fee. See id. The Ninth Circuit recognizes a federal 
trust responsibility siInilar to that of tribes in other states towards these corporations, even in light 
of the ANCSA. See id. 
98 See Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 6128. 
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Pursuant to the rules of the tribal court, which require the exhaus-
tion of remedies, the district court submitted the pending issues to the 
tribal court in Chilkat IIL99 Plaintiff Michael Johnson filed his com-
plaint in the Chilkat tribal court on January 8, 1990.100 That same day, 
the duly appointed chief judge and alternate chief judge of the court 
recused themselves since they would be witnesses at the trial. 101 Judge 
Bowen, a Klallam Indian from Washington's Olympic Peninsula and a 
Juneau attorney, was appointed justice to the court by operation of the 
Chilkat Indian Village Resolution No. 90-0006.102 
All Tlingit defendants represented themselves during the trial.105 
Michael Johnson however, refused to appear at trial.104 The trial dead-
line was further extended by Mr. johnson's failure to comply with 
discovery requests and by other delays based on what Judge Bowen 
later found to be "unsubstantiated and likely disingenuous reasons. "105 
The trial finally began on January 18, 1993, and took four weeks to 
complete. 106 
This Note is concerned with the following issues decided at trial: 
(1) whether the Whale House rain screen and four house 
posts constituted "artifacts, clan crests, or other Indian art 
works" within the meaning of the relevant tribal ordinance; 
[and] (2) whether the tribe ha[d] the power to enforce the 
ordinance against the defendants, including the non-Indian 
art dealer Michael Johnson and his corporation.107 
Prior to discussing the plaintiff's discourse, it is necessary to lay the 
foundation of semiotic theory. 
99 See id. 
100 See w. 
101 See id. 
102 See id.; see also Marilee Enge, lWiose Laws', ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 1993, at AI. 
103 See Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 6129. 
104 See ill. 
105 Id. 
106 See ill. at 6130. 
107 Id. 
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II. THE CLASH BETWEEN Two DIFFERENT INTERPRETIVE 
COMMUNITIES 
A Semiotics: The Basics 
57 
Semiotics studies the creation, development and evolution of signs 
used in communication. lOS A sign is an "intellectual idea" that is de-
fined with respect to the expectations of a particular community.l09 
Notable semiotic theoreticians include Felix Cohen, Wesley Hohfeld, 
Saussure, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Umberto Eco.110 
Legal semiotics requires that all sign systems emanate from natural 
language or be expressed through natural language.lll The semiotic 
method assumes that the users of signs (words or legal arguments) are 
operating on a mutual understanding of the sign.ll2 Semiotic method-
ology examines the exchange of signs within communication and the 
manner in which sign systems evolve as members of communities 
"continually reassess their future goals and values and attempt to rein-
terpret existing codes of rules and values to meet current changing 
needs and wants."ll!I The process is dialogic in nature, and language 
becomes the carrier of exchange.1l4 
108 See KEVELSON, supra nore 15, at !I-6; Malloy, supra nore !II, at 212;Jeremy Paul, 'I'M Politics 
of Legal Semiotics, 691Ex. L. REv. 1779, 1787-88 (1991). 
109 See KEVELSON, supra nore 15, at 285-86; Malloy, supra nore !II, at 21!1-14; Paul, supra nore 
108, at 1782. Paul argues that "despire the fancy label, legal semiotics holds significant porential 
for bringing together people of diverse training and background in ways that will foster a true 
sense of inrellectual community." Id.; see also Douglas W. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative 
Structure in Plea Bargaining Language, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65, 67 Gudith N. 
Levi &: Anne Graffiun Walker eds., 1990). Stories may have different significance depending on 
the group to which they are told. Tellers may also verbalize a story "precisely to discover with 
recipients, what evaluation should be made of it." Id. at 67. 
llO See generally F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (W. Baskin trans., 1959); 
UMBERTO Eco, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976); CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, CoLLECTED PAPERS 
19!11-!l5 (P. Weiss et al. eds., 1958); CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, CoNTRIBUTIONS TO THE NATION, 
1869-1908 (K.C. Ketner et al. eds., 1970); CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, WRITINGS (M. Fisch et al. 
eds.,1986); Felix Cohen, 7ranscendentalNonsenseand theFunctionaIApproach,!l5 CoLUM. L. REv. 
809 (19!15); Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
2!1 YALE LJ. 16 (191!1). 
III See KEVELSON, supra nore 15, at 5. 
112 See id. at 5-6;J.M. Balkin, 'I'M Hohfoldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 1119, 1121 (1990). See generally DE SAUSSURE, supra nore 110. 
llSKEVELSON, supranore 15, at !I!I; see also GARTH GILLIAN, FROM SIGN TO SYMBOL 7 (1982). 
"The sign defines its spread and signifying exrension in and through the inrerpretant toward 
which it looks for its essential clarification and for its ultimare grounding as a significant utterance 
within human discourse." See GILLIAN, supra, at 7. 
114 See KEVELSON, supra nore 15, at 6. 
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What links semiotics to law is that "[s]igns designate aspects of the 
real world through contractual action, through a kind of trust" that 
others in our community are operating in our same qualitative like-
nesses and differences.1l5 Analyzing Chilkat III through the semiotic 
method is appropriate because semiotic theory, like the Chilkat cultu-
ral/legal perspective, focuses on a community understanding of events 
and consequential justice, and not on individuals.1I6 This perspective 
can be contrasted with Euro-American legal culture which focuses on 
the construct of "an atomized individual, holding rights against the 
world, including his own community. "11'7 
Since we are concerned with the definition of sovereignty, it is key 
to view how each legal culture, whether Native American or Euro-
American, constructs sovereignty. lIS The Native American construct of 
sovereignty imputes subjectivity because it focuses on tribal autonomy 
or self-determination. 119 Yet this construction of sovereignty is not con-
sistent with the construction of the "I" in dominant legal discourse.12o 
Through the lens of legal semiotics one cannot refer to an indi-
vidual fact, but only to what one's community has perceived to be 
factual through relations that it has previously observed.ll!l Take, for 
example, the village's perception of Mr. Johnson as a thief, versus the 
outside world's perception of Mr. Johnson as an art dealer on a cultur-
ally justified mission to salvage decaying artifacts.122 Because Mr. John-
son tried to remove the artifacts, his name could only exist within a 
115 See Malloy, supra note 31, at 213 (quoting ROBERTA KEVELSON, CHARLES S. PEIRCE'S 
METHOD OF METHODS 5-6 (1987». "Legal Semiotics holds that in each case there is a legal event, 
in which legal discourse is one kind of legal act, and that legal procedures, as communicative 
events in which both legal actors and nonauthorized persons participate, are exchanges of official 
messages by means of verbal and nonverbal signs and are also legal acts of a nonverbal kind." 
KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 5. 
116ChilkatIndian Village, IRA v.Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6130-37 (1993) [hereinafter Chilkat 
IIlJ. 
117 Carriere, supra note 23, at 596. 
118 See ill. 
119 See ill. at 595. 
120 See id. "The subject, whether an individual or a group, constitutes the 'I' of the sentence 
for the discourse and is empowered to act and speak in it. The discourse thus constitutes the 
subjectivity of those that participate in it." Id. at 591. 
121 See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 6, 285-86. Paul notes that legal scholars "emphasize the 
ways in which legal concepts draw meaning from their place within broader legal argument, just 
as semioticians have stressed the ways in which words take meaning from their place within a 
larger linguistic system." Paul, supra note 108, at 1782. 
122 See Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6130-37 (1993) [hereinafter 
ChilJeat Ill]. 
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negative context when spoken by the Klukwan community.ll!ll This 
paradigm exemplifies how a fact can only exist when mirrored against 
human experience.I24 
Just as communication is a semiotic process, so is the legal sys-
tem.I25 Stated simply, law is the prototypical code of reference.I26 Law 
seems static, but it is only static in hypothetical terms because decisions 
are continually reinterpreted to reflect current societal views.127 It is 
when social consciousness remains static that communicative reality, 
and therefore law, becomes statiC.ll!8 
The concept "of a legal system, consisting of interrelating commu-
nicative processes between legal discourse and legal practice, functions 
almost universally as a model of dialogic thought development. "129 Two 
fundamental assumptions of semiotics are: 
(1) All communication is a process of exchange of mean-
ingful signs, and signs and sign systems such as natural lan-
guage mediate between communicating persons and those 
objects in the phenomenal, physical world of experience to 
which they refer; and 
(2) All human societies have developed complex systems of 
both verbal and nonverbal sign systems which are not static, 
but which evolve continuously to correspond with and to 
represent changing social norms and the evolving, growing 
social consciousness of any given community.IllO 
In the same vein, law is a locus for new ideas and relationships 
that emerge from the social consciousness of any given community.IlII 
This locus develops and exists as a system of sign exchanges, and 
therefore, "the law is a semiotic process. "Ill2 By analyzing the artifacts 
as signs in their own right, as well as the concept of tribal sovereignty 
as a legal sign, one is forced to reckon with the Chilkat III tribal court 
123 See id. 
124 See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 6, 285-86. 
125 See ill. at 4-6. 
126 See ill. at 4. 
11'1 See Malloy, supra note 31, at 214-15. 
128 See id. 
129KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 4; Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97lIARv. L. REv. 
4,5-8 (1983). 
1lI0KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 4. 
lSI See Malloy, supra note 31, at 214. 
132Id. 
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system. IlIlI Through semiotic inquiry, one is able to decipher the under-
lying legal relationships and reconstruct the legal dialogue in the 
Chilkat III case. I54 The Chilkat III court case broke the barriers of legal 
stasis by challenging the Euro-American notions of sovereignty and 
ownership operating in the village.1lI5 Villagers challenged the domi-
nant legal construction of sovereignty with principles of tribal law and 
won.I1I6 
III. THE LITIGATION PHASE 
What separates Chilkat III from other cases is its creation of an 
arena of adjudication-a tribal court-from which to watch the funda-
mentally semiotic discourse of law unravel itself to create new mean-
ing.1lI'1 This arena allowed the Chilkat III court to characterize its own 
legal issues, mainly "(1) whether the artifacts constitute[d] 'artifacts, 
clan crests, or other Indian art works' within the meaning of the 
relevant tribal ordinance [and] (2) whether the tribe ha[d] the power 
to enforce the ordinance against the defendants and MichaelJohnson 
"IllS 
Strict rules of evidence were not imposed by the Chilkat III 
court.1lI9 As Judge Bowen wrote in his decision, "The only rule of 
1S!! See generally Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6127-42 (1993) 
[hereinafter Chilkat Ill]. 
1M See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 273-86; Malloy, supra note 31, at 214. Rosemary Coombe 
suggests that "the social world is constituted only in and through representational relations of 
difference that are constantly shifting in our all-too-human efforts to give meaning to its terms." 
Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and 
Democratic Dialogue, 69 'lEx. L. REv. 1853, 1856 (1991). Seemingly subjective, the politics oflega! 
semiotics could inevitably aSlIUme the politics of postmodernity which could be highly detrimental 
to the growth and change of signs defined within a community. See J.M. Balkin, Th8 Promise of 
Legal Semiotics, 69 'lEx. L. REv. 1831, 1851 (1991). The postmodern condition perceives the 
individual self as a creation of social construction. See id. Balkin states: "if the self is socially 
constructed, and if the selfs freedom is its freedom as a socially constructed individual, one might 
easily defend existing social customs and practices because they are the basis of our individual 
authenticity and freedom." Id. In this example, semiotics analysis turns upon itself because 
individuals defend their social customs as the only true expressions of their individuality and 
authenticity, therefore resisting change. See id. at 1851. 
135 See generally Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6127-42. 
1!16See id. 
157 See id.;Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384, 386 (D. Alaska 1978). Judge 
Von Der Heydt wrote, "In order to provide a forum for the resolution of disputes such as the one 
presented here, the Council has passed a resolution providing for the composition and jurisdic-
tion of a tribal court." Johnson, 457 F. Supp. at 386. 
158 Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130. 
1S9 See id. 
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evidence at trial was relevancy. "140 This strategy proved to be very 
effective in determining issues of ownership because inherent within 
ownership principles lie the precepts of sovereignty.141 
Previous judges had ignored historical testimony which was essen-
tial in determining ownership.l42 During Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Vil-
lage, Judge Von Der Heydt attempted to resolve the issues of owner-
ship.I4!! Mter Martha Willard, an elder of the Ganaxteidi clan and 
member of the Whale House had been on the stand for six hours 
reciting genealogical testimony, the judge turned to Ms. Willard's at-
torney and said, "'Is there some way you can shorten this testimony?"'144 
Tony Strong recalls that Ms. Willard's attorney asked her to shorten 
her story, to which she responded that she could not. I45 Upon further 
insistence by her attorney, Ms. Willard finally agreed to abbreviate 
her testimony.l46 Nevertheless, she continued testifying for another six 
hours.I47 Humorous as the tale may be, only historical testimony could 
reveal who, if anyone, had tribal title to the land.l48 
Robert Cover has argued that courts are jurispathic because they 
destroy law that naturally develops in small communities of people 
mutually committed to a cause. 149 They do so by removing "uncertainty, 
lack of clarity, and difference of opinion about what the law isH-all 
key elements for the growth of law. ISO Within a semiotic system, how-
ever, uncertainty is what generates different interpretive communi-
ties.ISI In Johnson v. Chilkat, Martha Willard needed to relay the history 
of the totems in order for the judge to understand ownership issues.IS2 
Her testimony would reveal the community identity that resided within 
the totems and help determine the rightful, matrilineal caretakers of 
the totems. IS!! Yet Judge Von Der Heydt did not want to listen to the 
140 Id. 
141 See generally id. at 6130-37. 
142 See Strong, supra note I, at 14. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 See Strong, supra note I, at 14. 
148 See Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6130-37 (1993) [hereinafter 
Chilkat IIlJ. See grmerally Enge, Battle Over a Birthright, supra note 9; Enge, Master Carver, supra 
note 46. 
149 See Cover, supra note 129, at 40-44. 
150 Id. at 40. 
151 See Strong, supra note I, at 14. See grmerally Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 
384 (D. Alaska 1978). 
152 See Strong, supra note I, at 14. See generaUy Johnson, 457 F. Supp. 384. 
153 See Strong, supra note I, at 14. 
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confusing genealogical monologues or her story as to why her own his-
tory resided within the totems.154 "Meaning," in his courtroom, would 
come from clear, not necessarily convincing, testimony as to who was 
the rightful owner.155 Ownership would then determine sovereignty.l56 
Judge Von Der Heydt appropriately decided that issues dealing with 
the conversion of property were not for state courts to decide.157 The 
issues belonged within Chilkat's tribal court jurisdiction. 158 
The hours of testimony recited in Chilkat III are proof that tribal 
courts are jurisgenerative.l59 Since "tribal customary law is capable of 
reflecting the law created by the relatively small tribal communities," 
this capacity has "more potential to be jurisgenerative than federal and 
state courts. "160 Tribal courts are able to reflect the law by allowing 
narrative to enter into the courtroom.161 Semiotics links narrative and 
law together since narrative is necessary for the conveyance and crea-
tion oflegal concepts.162 Cover's 1983 article lies squarely within today's 
articulations of legal semiotic process: 
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from 
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. . . . Once 
understood in the context of the narratives that give it mean-
ing, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, 
but ... signs by which each of us communicates with others.16S 
Storytelling, both through oral testimony and through Judge Bow-
en's written decision, played a key role in Chilkat Ills tribal justice 
system.l64 One of the most important issues to be determined was the 
meaning that the artifacts imparted to the community.l65 Once mean-
ing was established, it would be possible to rule on the totems' status 
154 See id. 
155 See ill. 
156 See generally Johnsoo, 457 F. Supp. at 384-89. 
157 See id. at 387. 
158 See ill. 
159 See Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentatiun: Representing Crazy Hurse, 27 CoNN. 
L. REv. 1003, 1004 n.2 (1995). 
160 Id. 
161 See ill. 
162 See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 5. See generally Delgado, supra note 14, at 2440-41; 
Sherwin, supra note 16, at 685-95. 
163 Cover, supra note 129, at 4. 
164 See Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v.Johnson, 20 I.L.R 6127, 6130-37 (1993) [hereinafter 
Chilkat llIJ. 
165 See id. 
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as "property" within the meaning of the Artifacts Ordinance.l66 Judge 
Bowen's court used accessible cultural forms to express identity, com-
munity, difference and meanings of property.I67 Members of the tribe 
were given the opportunity to convey stories about the meaning that 
the artifacts had within the community.I68 
Objectivity is the goal oflegal writing. However, objectivity is often 
limiting in its quest to determine truth or identity.I69 In presenting 
neutral points of view, legal writing and discourse neglect to question 
the "moral and political value judgments that lie at the heart of any 
legal inquiry. "170 Legal writing and discourse typically consist of a linear 
construction with a limited vocabulary of signifiers.171 This limitation 
in vocabulary occurs because legal education requires students to "in-
ternalize a number of legal signifiers that have particular content 
[signified]. The multiaccentual nature of the sign is given a uniaccen-
tual reading. "172 The law student then internalizes these 'juridically 
defined (circumscribed) words, which become the basis of under-
standing. The student learns how these words are connected in linear 
form to produce acceptable legal discourse. "175 Property is one of the 
terms that the Western legal world has internalized as having a pre-
scribed meaning.174 Even though definitions of property have changed 
throughout history, one dominant meaning exists during a specific 
period of time.175 
The storytelling testimony in Chilkat III fragmented the linear 
definitions of property and ownership prof erred by the defendants by 
166 See id. at 6137. 
167 See Coombe, supra note 134, at 1855. This argument counters Rosemary Coombe's belief 
that post-modernism has stifled a community's ability to use accessible cultural forms. See id. My 
argument pulls from Nell Newton's belief that tribal courts tend to bejurisgenerative. SeeNewton, 
supra note 159, at 1005 n.2. 
16S See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130-37. Sherwin writes, "[ilf reality and meaning depend, to 
a significant extent, on perceptual and cognitive constructions, it becomes of no small interest 
to learn what interpretive frameworks are at work in specific legal contexts. One way to express 
this inquiry is to ask: what kinds of stories, and what modes of storytelling, are being used by 
lawyers, judges, and others within the legal system to construct and convey meaning." Sherwin, 
supra note 16, at 717. 
169 See Delgado, supra note 14, at 2441. 
170 Id. 
171 See Milovanovic, supra note 15, at 80-81. 
172 Id. at 80. 
175 Id. Legal semioticians have noted that lawyers and judges "employ a relatively small 
handful of argument forms to justify rule choices in many different areas of doctrine." See Balkin, 
supra note 134, at 1835. 
174 See KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 240-41. 
175 See id. 
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imparting subjectivity into the inquiry of the totems' status as "arti-
facts. "176 Community standards and each person's individualized ac-
count defined the artifacts as items of property.177 Storytelling sub-
verted objectivity by allowing the witnesses' value judgments to enter 
into legal discourse.178 Storytelling dialogue follows from semiotic the-
ory because the semiotic perspective of property "attempt[s] to show 
that property in law is not one idea only" but "a multitude of ideas, or 
systems of thought, each of which is represented by this general term 
property. "179 
Judge Bowen's opinion provides a discussion section which the 
judge terms a "chronological account of the testimony and documen-
tary evidence presented at trial which is relevant" to the issues pre-
sented in the case.18°The story-like narrative of Judge Bowen's opinion 
sets it apart from the standard state or federal court opinion.181 Judge 
Bowen recounts the four-week trial by summarizing the testimony of 
each witness in the same order that it was given in court. 182 He describes 
witness testimony at length, notes the dress and appearance of wit-
nesses, and relays his opinions of witnesses credibility.183 Through the 
storytelling method, the opinion almost becomes a healing ceremony 
of its own.184 
The trial began with the testimony of Joe Hotch, President of the 
Chilkat Indian Village Council and leader of the Whale House.l85 Mr. 
Hotch's function as a storyteller was to lay down the foundation of 
Chilkat social structure and tribal law.186 He provided information 
about the tribe's governing body and demographics.187 More impor-
tantly, like most witnesses, he stated the identity of his mother and 
father. 188 Determining lineal relationships was important because the 
Tlingit defendants claimed rightful ownership of the artifacts by ma-
176 See Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, 20 I.L.R. 6127, 6130-37 (1993) [hereinafter 
Chilkat IIlJ . 
177 See w. 
178 See Delgado, supra note 14, at 244l. 
179KEVELSON, supra note 15, at 242. 
180 Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6130. 
181 See w. at 6130-37. 
182 See w. 
183 See w. 
184 See w. 
185 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 613l. 
186 See w. 
187 See id. 
186 See id. 
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trilineal descent.189 The defendants argued that, as members of the 
Whale House, they owned the rights to sell the artifacts. 190 Traditionally, 
under the Tlingit matrilineal system of descent, Tlingit males moved 
to the house of their maternal uncle between the ages of eight and 
twelve, where they were raised and instructed about their clan and 
tribal law. 191 They would then become members of the house to which 
their uncle belonged.192 As Judge Bowen noted, ''This simple account-
ing of the witness's matrilineal background is significant within the 
context of this case because it logically follows that [the witness] would 
consider the Tlingit defendants ... to be members of the Valley House; 
not the Whale House. "193 
Tlingit social structure works in this manner: there are two Tlingit 
moieties, Raven and Eagle.194 It follows that all Tlingits are either of 
the Raven moiety or Eagle moiety.195 Members of one moiety may not 
marry within their moiety but must marry a person of the opposite 
moiety.196 There are also clans within each moiety and "[a]lthough 
identification by Tlingits as members of a particular village is very 
significant for many purposes, the clan is the primary and most impor-
tant affiliation for Tlingits. "197 There are several clans within the Eagle 
moiety, but "perhaps conveniently, all Ravens in Klukwan are members 
of the Ganaxteidi Clan. "198 Lastly, different house groups exist within 
each clan. Among these houses are the Killer Whale House, the Bear 
House, the Frog House, and the Valley House.199 It is also important 
to note that Tlingit society functions as a meritocracy, "where one 
achieves high status not through physical wealth but through good 
deeds."2°O Unlike a caste system, "one can change his or her status 
through the nature of their [sic] deeds. "201 
By having the witnesses recount their matrilineal background, 
true members of the Whale House would be revealed.202 Determining 
189 See id. at 6131 n.15. 
190 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6133 n.21. 
191 See itl. at 6131 n.l5. 
192 See itl. 
19~ Id. at 6133 n.21. 
194 See id. at 6131. 
195 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6131. 
196 See itl. 
197Id. 
198Id. 
199 See itl. at 6131-37. 
200 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6134. 
201 See itl. 
202 See itl. at 6133 n.21. 
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the real members of the Whale House would not justify property rights 
to the artifacts, however, because Mr. Hotch and many other witnesses 
had yet to define the artifacts as "clan trust property"-property in 
which every Tlingit had a vested spiritual interest.203 The term "clan 
trust property" is comprised of the words appropriated from Western 
law that helped the Chilkat III plaintiffs' define and win their case.204 
Throughout the trial, the plaintiffs fostered their belief that the 
artifacts are inherently community property, yet they adopted a west-
ernized property concept for the Chilkat III decision which inherently 
represents an alternative meaning of property and ownership.205 Rose-
mary Coombe has argued that the postmodern subject who occupies 
space within our culturally commodified society must inevitably resort 
to "engagement with commodified cultural forms" when taking politi-
cal action.206 In order for the Chilkat community to restore its notions 
of community property, it had to use the discourse of commodified 
cultural forms in legal action, thereby using the term "clan trust prop-
erty."207 
Mr. Hotch defined "clan trust property" as property that belongs 
to the entire clan, which cannot be disposed of without consent of the 
clan.208 Artifacts become "clan trust property" when they are presented 
"in a ceremony in which members of the opposite 'tribe' (Le., in this 
case members of clans of the Eagle moiety) are invited .... "209 Mr. 
Hotch said that the Whale House artifacts were subject to this process 
and that the artifacts played a central role in numerous ceremonies in 
which he participated.210 As a hitsati, or leader of the Whale House, Mr. 
Hotch had a "duty under tribal law to care for the property of the 
house and clan, and ha[d] no right to sell or otherwise dispose of clan 
property. "211 
More importantly, the artifacts do not just have "great spiritual 
significance to the Ganaxteidi Clan, which has primary custodial rights 
over them," but the tribe on. the whole also has an interest in the 
205 See id. at 613l. 
204 See id. 
205 See Chilkat Ill, 20 I.L.R. at 613l. 
206 Coombe, supra note 134, at 1855;John Brigham, Signs in the Attic: Courts in Material Life, 
in SPACES AND SIGNIFICATIONS 151 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1996). Court buildings have become 
commodified architectural signs of justice. See Brigham, supra, at 151. 
207 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6131. 
208 See id. 
209 Id. 
210 See id. 
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artifacts because of their inherent "healing quality. "212 Mr. Hotch and 
other witnesses recalled that: 
when a member of an opposite clan (of the Eagle moiety) 
died, and a potlatch was held as a part of the progression of 
Tlingit funeral arrangements, members of the grieving clan 
would be brought before the rain screen and told that it 
constituted medicine which would relieve the loss of their 
clan member.213 
Mr. Hotch recalled that the artifacts were even used during a 
Peace Party ceremony in 1976 intended to heal wounds resulting from 
contacts with Michael Johnson.214 Representatives of both clans at-
tended the ceremony and both clans agreed that the artifacts should 
not be removed.215 Mter the Peace Party, Mr. Hotch wrote a letter to 
Michael and Sharon Johnson in which he stated: ''These artifacts are 
a part of our Thlinget needs to retain, as they represent our past and 
our future within the art itself. . . . A Thlinget selling its tribal artifacts is 
degrading its entire cian, much more the Thlinget nation. '~16 Ironically, 
MichaelJohnson dismissed the concepts of communal identity that Mr. 
Hotch stressed and replied with his commodified notions of "world 
property" by writing, "Tlingit art is now recognized by all the art 
authorities of the world as one of the greatest that ever existed and is 
important to the whole history of mankind .... I would never attempt 
to purchase objects from a clan keeper without the consent of the 
entire clan. "217 
Andrew Hope III, a Tlingit writer and scholar, testified that the 
artifacts could not be owned due to their spiritual characteristics.218 In 
testifying about the ceremonial process that the artifacts underwent, 
he said, "the spirits of ancestors are honored, and those spirits are 
warmed and like to be around clans crests such as the Whale House 
artifacts. "219 Mr. Hope further expressed his view, "that such objects, 
which can include songs and stories, cannot be 'owned'; there is no 
way to put a price on the spirits, and certainly no hitsati, i.e., caretaker 
212 See Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6131. 
215 Id. 
214 See id. at 6132. 
215 See id. 
216Id. (emphasis added). Tlingit may also be spelled Thlinget. 
217 Chilkat III, 20 I.L.R. at 6132. 
218 See id. at 6134. 
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of a tribal house, has the right to unilaterally dispose of clan crest 
objects. "220 
A recurring theme within the trial was that the artifacts themselves 
constituted a story; that below their surface lay words.221 Elder clan 
member, George Stevens, Sr., recalled his mother's deathbed words: 
"[t]here's a story on the screen and our respect is on it. Without this 
screen and the corner posts, this house is going to be like a house with 
ghosts-a weird place. "222 Mr. Stevens further noted that he felt com-
pelled to testify against the Tlingit defendants to honor his mother's 
words.223 Viewing this. statement through a semiotic perspective, it fol-
lows that his mother's words were immortalized within the artifacts 
themselves.224 When referring to the artifacts as "clan trust property," 
Mr. Stevens testified that "as a matter of tribal law, no one individual 
could sell the artifacts, and that the artifacts represent the history of 
the Ganaxteidi Clan. "225 
David Katzeek, the son of a member of the Ganaxteidi Clan ex-
plained that the primary significance of the artifacts is "knowing who 
you are . . . with us, these particular artifacts tell a story. . . . When 
you're selling an artifact ... you're not only getting rid of a piece of 
wood ... you're getting rid of the music, the song, the dance, and the 
good, the bad, and the ugly. "226 
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Katzeek's words bring into play the concept 
that language is not the only form of semiotic signs, but that symbols, 
such as artifacts, are signs too; within those signs lie innumerable 
stories infused with meaning.227 Ruth Kasko, a village member, com-
pared the artifacts as signs to the American Flag.228 Ms. Kasko's point 
was that as Americans, it is hard to imagine who we are without the 
flag. 229 For the Chilkat community, the artifacts represented their entire 
history, and within that history lay their identity.230 Selling the artifacts 
would mean selling their history to the Western world, and as Andrew 
Hope III stated, the artifacts, which included stories, could not be 
220 Id. 
221 See ill. 
222 Chilkat IlL 20 I.L.R. at 6134. 
223 See ill. 
224 See ill. 
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"owned. "m By selling the artifacts the community would be condoning 
ownership.!!!2 In sum, the community's testimony relayed semiotic 
thought in that the artifacts, like words, are semiotic signs that carry 
identity, an identity that can only be defined in reference to a commu-
nity's standards.2!!!! 
CONCLUSION 
The worm dish's story (the worm dish being the one artifact that 
was unable to be removed because of its rotting bottom) serves to 
remind Klukwan villagers that a community can be torn apart if a bad 
seed is nourished. Hundreds of years ago, the worm, which was secretly 
fed by a young villager, almost ate the entire community. Today, Mi-
chael Johnson'S notion that the artifacts could be sold and therefore 
owned, grew so large that it threatened to destroy the community once 
more. At the end of his opinion, Judge Bowen writes: 
All members of the village continue to rely on the artifacts 
for essential ceremonial purposes. The artifacts embody the 
clan's history. Just as earlier attempts to remove the artifacts 
caused injury to the tribe through friction and clashes among 
tribal houses and clans, a fortiori, the 1984 removal in viola-
tion of the tribe's 1976 ordinance had a direct effect on the 
health and welfare of the tribe.2M 
The artifacts themselves served as the means to draw the commu-
nity back together. By allowing witnesses to recount the meaning that 
the artifacts imparted to the community, the Chilkat III court validated 
the Chilkat community's existing norms. The tribal members' testi-
mony, along with the actual artifacts, stood as signs of these norms. 
More importantly, the Chilkat III court's final judgment established 
new value for the Chilkat community-the value of its inherent tribal 
sovereignty. 
231 Set! ill. at 6184. 
232 See Chilkat m, 20 I.L.R at 6135. 
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